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Title: Applying market design theory to 'greyfields' housing supply. 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether innovation in market design can address persistent 
problems of housing choice and affordability in the ageing inner and middle suburbs of 
Australian cities. Despite policy consensus that urban intensification of these low density, 
‘greyfield’ areas should be able to deliver positive social, economic and environmental 
outcomes, existing models of development have not increased housing stock or 
delivered adequate gains in sustainability, affordability or diversity of dwellings in 
greyfield localities. We argue that application of smart market and matching market 
principles to the supply of multi-unit housing can unlock land, reduce development costs 
and improve design. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
This paper examines whether developments in 'market design' can address persistent 
problems of housing choice and affordability in the inner and middle suburbs of 
Australian cities. Australia's ageing middle suburbs are the result of a low density and 
car-dependent garden city approach to planning that failed to consider possible future 
resource or environmental constraints on urban development. Intensification of these 
‘greyfield’ areas is expected to deliver positive social, economic and environmental 
outcomes (Gurran et al., 2006; Trubka et al., 2008; Adams 2009; Goodman et al., 2010; 
Newton et al., 2011).  However, existing models of development have not increased 
stock or delivered adequate gains in sustainability, affordability and diversity of dwellings 
(Major Cities Unit 2010). In this article we argue that the application of market design 
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theory, enabled by the internet, along with other institutional innovations, offers a new 
policy approach and practical measures to address these problems. 
 
New market design approaches such as smart markets and matching markets have 
enabled stunning improvements in resource allocation for a range of goods and services 
in the wider economy. However, to this point, their application to the housing sector has 
been limited. In this article, we outline the theoretical and practical dimensions of market 
design theory, and discuss how its application to housing markets can challenge 
prevailing market structures and remedy market failures. 
 
The article begins by discussing housing supply in Australia, with particular reference to 
the problems of securing multi-unit housing in existing suburbs through existing market 
structures. We argue for diversification in housing procurement using housing 
development cooperatives (HDCs) as a model particularly suited to delivering multi-unit 
housing, and argue that the viability of HDCs can be greatly enhanced by the application 
of market design theory. The following section discusses this theory and analyses 
existing applications in the field of housing and applies it to two housing sub-markets: 
private multi-unit residential development, and the affordable housing sector. In the 
former, the contribution of market design to aggregation of housing consumers and the 
central role of a smart market manager are explored. In the latter, the discussion focuses 
on the role of market design in unlocking new sources of land equity, specifically under-
utilised land assets of not-for-profit agencies (NFP) and local government authorities. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of land trust mechanisms which could facilitate 
the use of such land for housing and contribute substantially to housing affordability.  
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Housing supply in Australia: problems of multi-unit residential development  
 
The National Housing Supply Council (2010) forecasts a substantial gap between supply 
and demand of dwellings in Australian cities over the next few decades. This mismatch 
includes location, type and affordability of dwellings. The ‘greyfields’ or middle ring 
suburbs in major Australian cities are identified in recent policy statements and critical 
analysis as the prime locus for solutions to this problem. 
 
Greyfield residential precincts are defined here as under-utilised property assets 
located in the middle suburbs of large Australian cities, where residential building 
stock is failing (physically, technologically and environmentally) and energy, water 
and communications  infrastructure is in need of regeneration. Greyfields are 
usually occupied and privately owned sites typical of urban development 
undertaken from the 1950s to the 1970s (Newton  et al. 2011, pp. 1-2).  
 
The Australian residential development market is characterised by high rise apartments 
in and near central business districts; and tract development of low density, usually 
detached dwellings on urban fringes (Berry, 1999; Alves and London, 2012). Table 1 
shows that the proportion of medium and high density dwelling approvals and 
commencements in 2011/12 remains under 50% of total housing supply, a proportion 
previously reached only for a short period in the mid-1960s. Medium density housing 
approvals comprise only a minor proportion of this total (Alves and London 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Medium and high density (a) dwelling approvals as a proportion of total 
approvals, Melbourne, 1956/57 to 2011/12 (b) 
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(a) Medium Density is defined as: semi-detached row or terrace house, flats, units or apartments in one, two 
or three storey blocks. High Density is defined as: flats units or apartments in a four or more storey block 
(b) Data for 1956/57 to 1995/96 relates to dwelling commencements in the Melbourne Statistical Division 
(MSD), as defined at the time of release. Data for 1995/96 onwards relates to dwelling unit approvals in the 
31 Local Government Areas that comprise MSD 
Source: ABS (1956/57 – 1983/84) Statistics of Victoria: Building Operations; ABS (1984/85 – 1995/96) 
Dwelling Unit Commencements Reported by Approving Authorities, Victoria, Cat. no. 8741.2; ABS (1996/97 
– 2002/03) Building Approvals, Victoria, Cat. no. 8731.2 (customised tables) 
 
Research by Phan et al. (2008) and Ruming (2010) suggests residential development in 
the greyfield suburbs is dominated by 'opportunistic' small scale multi-unit housing. 
Newton et al. (2011) suggest much this of 'informal' development is speculative. These 
developers tend to build between three and five, one or two story attached dwellings on 
sites that formerly contained a single detached house. They are generally unconcerned 
with 'good' design and sustainability. Notably, 'the uncoordinated nature of this 
redevelopment limits choice in dwelling design, performance and quality. Without 
strategic oversight, there are no corresponding improvements in infrastructure, servicing 
or amenity' (Newton et al. 2011, p. 21). There are also development firms building 
'higher-density apartment typologies in response to strategic development policies' 
(Newton et al. 2011, p.21). These developers have a corporate structure and fund 
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projects through debt finance (Chandler, 2009). These apartments too are often criticised 
for poor design, material quality and sustainability.  Affordability, to the extent that it can 
be claimed, results from reducing floor space, ceiling height, reliance on borrowed light 
and sub-optimal ventilation. Current offerings tend to be one or two bedrooms with an 
increasing number of studio apartments (bedsits). New product is often priced close 
comparable detached stock, providing a significant disincentive for downsizing. 
 
Despite the corporate residential development sector delivering a largely undifferentiated 
offering, this sector has both the size and technical capacity to embrace innovation, and 
has the potential to increase output. Accordingly, it is corporate residential developers 
with whom we are concerned rather than owner builders. However, as will be discussed 
shortly, there are also opportunities for new entities to engage in multi-unit development 
which we see as important for increasing the supply of affordable housing.  
 
 
Current financial/market models for new housing supply 
 
Another widely acknowledged hurdle to increasing the supply of affordable housing is 
residential development finance (RDF). This is the subject of limited research and policy 
debate. RDF is a critical consideration in the development process, a fact which became 
increasingly apparent following the recent global financial crisis (GFC). Renewed 
attention to risk meant that RDF became harder to obtain in Australia after the GFC. The 
cost of money and liquidity are highly influenced by global markets. However the cost of 
money also reflects development risks, which are generally local. These include land 
cost, consumer demand and capacity to pay, cost of materials, labour and, of course, 
planning and building regulations.  These variables have historically justified the 
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argument that multi-unit residential development is high risk requiring a high rate of 
return. The consequence is a partially speculative industry, with risk addressed by 
financier requirements for pre-sales as discussed in the following section.  
 
Prospective borrowers are faced with lengthy negotiation periods following extensive 
information exchange about every detail of the project and the borrowers themselves. 
This complex credit assessment process can be compressed into the ‘Five Cs’ of credit 
assessment as indicated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment 
Five ’Cs’  Description  Includes 
Character Appraisal of the borrower’s 
integrity  
Character 
Competence identification 
Social and financial stability 
Honesty and reliability 
Capital Appraisal of the borrower’s 
financial strength  
Assets and liability statement 
Title searches 
Gearing 
Capacity  Analysis of the borrower’s 
capacity to repay 
Cashflow 
Confirmation of income/project revenue
Conditions Analysis of key external and 
internal factors  
Loan conditions and covenants 
Market and economic conditions 
Collateral Appraisal of security available to 
support the 
borrowing 
Mortgage 
Guarantee 
Lien 
Multipartite agreements 
Fixed/floating charges 
Source: Adapted from Weaver and Kingsley (2001) and Weerasooria (1998). 
 
Even where credit worthiness can be established, project funding hinges on the most 
critical part of the development process: pre-sales (Bryant, 2012; Property Council of 
Australia, 2012).  
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The presale role in lending criteria is two-fold. Firstly, it confirms the design and 
pricing of the product is acceptable to the housing market (Conditions). Secondly, 
settlement of presale contracts form the future cashflow/revenue for the project 
and therefore confirm the Capacity of the project to repay its debts (Bryant, 2010: 
390) 
 
Providers of RDF (primarily banks) require a nominated percentage of pre-sales prior to 
the extension of monies required to commence construction. The need to obtain pre-
sales within a limited timeframe in turn stifles innovative product development, with a 
resulting loss of quality (Chandler, 2009). This may reflect the impact of 'cottage' 
investors purchasing apartments for future rental income (up to 60% of apartments1) or 
the high proportion of cottage investment may simply reflect what is being built. Chandler 
(2009) argues reliance on cottage investors has inhibited long overdue reform to the 
housing development sector.  In this context owner-occupiers are hard pressed to 
influence the apartment product coming onto the market. Furthermore, cottage investors, 
particularly those who have borrowed to purchase, are able to deduct the interest 
accruing on their loans against their other taxable income as a result of Australia's 
idiosyncratic negative gearing provisions. More recently investors can claim a tax rebate 
of around $10,000 p.a. for period of ten years if they accept a tenant eligible for the 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS). Both these schemes are ostensibly aimed 
at increasing the provision of rental housing. This is not the place to discuss the merits 
and efficacy of these schemes but it highlights the disadvantage of owner-occupiers 
within the apartment market.  
 
                                                 
1
 Chandler 2009: Landlords in Australia typically own less than three properties (Hulse et al.. 2012). 
Unlike the US there is currently no large scale equity investment into long term private rental housing.  
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Pre-sale involves the purchaser 'buying off the plan', or signing a contract with the 
developer prior to the property being completed and having its own certificate of title.  At 
the time of signing the contract the purchaser will typically see architect's drawings, a 
floor plan, a schedule of finishes and other disclosure documentation but will have little 
recourse if there are design changes.  In addition, they have no control over who builds 
the development and have no guarantee of a completion date. It is possible that the 
development may not eventuate.  For the developers and financiers there is a risk of 
default at settlement. Legal action to enforce contracts became an issue in 2008/2009 
when purchasers were unable to obtain finance (Bryant, 2010). Bryant (2010) found a 
change arising from the GFC is that the pre-sale marketing costs are now covered by 
the developer's own equity contribution to the project rather than being funded by 
borrowings. This requires developers to prioritise projects to the most profitable only, 
further reducing the supply of affordable housing.  
 
For all of the importance of pre-sales, procurement appears to have altered little over 
past decades. Real estate agents are engaged to handle sales and inquiries, including 
operating display units. This typically costs around 2% of the dwelling sale price and up 
to 6% where investment marketing techniques are employed. Actual marketing costs are 
in addition to this and can include newspaper, magazine, internet, television and radio 
advertising, home show displays and international trade delegations. Elaborate display 
suites are constructed and fitted out and glossy brochures produced all in the effort to 
entice a buyer to commit sometimes years in advance of any product being delivered.  
 
Alternative models of housing procurement 
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Geoffrey London2 and associates identified a gap in the market existed for consumer 
initiated apartments as early as the 1980s (Dolin et al. 1992). They recognised that while 
an individual could purchase an existing house or apartment, or could initiate the 
construction of a detached dwelling, they were unable to initiate the construction of an 
apartment. Their response was to call for development cooperatives whose specific aim 
was to build multi-unit housing. They called this proposal 'Sector 4 Housing'3. London 
and associates formed a cooperative in the early 1990s and built an apartment block in 
Perth, Western Australia, establishing that significant cost savings could be achieved. 
However, the model has not been replicated. Forty years on people buying apartments 
remain with little choice other than developer initiated products.  
 
Since then some German state governments have facilitated 'terminating housing 
cooperatives' (THCs)  (what we call HDCs) which operate along the lines envisaged by 
London (Dolin et al. 1992). A cooperative is formed to undertake the development and 
then terminated when the development is finished, at which point strata titles are 
created.  These cooperatives are an established development model in Germany 
delivering significant cost reductions, and greater consumer satisfaction and housing 
performance (Alves and London, 2012). As the Office of the Victorian Government 
Architect (OVGA) notes it is ‘rare for individual households to initiate multi-unit housing 
development in which they intend to own and/or occupy a unit...In effect, the housing 
development co-operative takes the place of the developer in a multi-unit development. 
By removing speculation from the development process, the households involved stand 
                                                 
2 Geoffrey London is the current Victorian Government Architect 
 
3 Housing consumers can purchase an existing house or apartment, or can initiate the construction of a 
house but they cannot initiate the construction of a apartment. These other options are the other 3 sectors 
within the Sector 4 typology. 
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to make substantial cost savings, while also having far greater control over the outcome 
than if they were buying a unit ‘off the plan’’(OVGA 2012). Economic theory also 
suggests that the entry of HDCs into the market would place competitive pressure on 
corporate developers to lower prices and focus more on consumer preferences.  
 
Both the corporate (speculative) model and the cooperative (deliberative) development 
model rely on the timely engagement of the individual owner/investor to attract RDF to 
allow construction. This is where innovation in market design can be of immense value.  
 
Applying Market Design Principles to Housing Procurement 
 
In setting out to apply market design theory to housing procurement it is important to 
appreciate the extent to which housing as a commodity deviates significantly from the 
ideal market. The following features set housing apart from other types of assets: 
 Durability: houses are expensive and have long lives;  
 Fixity: houses are fixed in time and space; locality is an important aspect of 
desirability. This can result in disequilibrium in particular submarkets as a result 
of changes in demand; 
 Uniqueness and heterogeneity: each house is different because it is built in an 
exclusive space and the durability means there may be significant alterations 
over time;   
 Infrequency of trades; barriers exist to selling and buying housing; consumers 
have imperfect knowledge; search costs are high; purchase often involves some 
form of bidding;  
 Housing is more than a house: consumers purchase a bundle of attributes;  
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 Supply (construction) time is lengthy, as are title transfers; 
 Housing is increasingly an investment as well as consumption. (Smith 2001a; 
Marsh and Gibb 2011)  
A purchaser's decision to buy is heavily influenced by market intermediaries acting as 
gatekeepers, reflecting the impact of such market imperfections (Marsh and Gibb 2011). 
In this context, understanding consumer preferences is an important issue for public 
policy and for supply-side investment. (Kelly et al. 2011; Birrell et al. 2012)  
 
Market design is a relatively new branch of economics that has developed from the 
convergence of game theory and experimental economics (Roth, 2007). Market design 
'can create markets where there were none or fix them when they go wrong' (Roth, 
2007, p. 1). Two variants have emerged from the practical application of market design 
theory. These are matching markets, and smart markets.  Matching markets and smart 
markets facilitate transactions amongst a pool of participants rather than bilaterally 
between one buyer and one seller. Each aggregates and coordinates information, 
reducing transaction costs and minimising negative externalities (Stoneham and 
Thomas, 2011). 
 
Much of the success of matching and smart markets is owed to their ability to aggregate 
a critical number of potential buyers and sellers so that market participants can achieve 
a satisfactory transaction. In the language of market design, aggregation produces 
market thickness. Roth also identifies two other necessities. First, the market must be 
safe for the market participants. That is, participants must have the confidence and 
incentive to reveal the information they hold. Second, sometimes market processes can 
become victims of their own success. Thickness can create congestion so market design 
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must ensure transactions are conducted quickly and satisfactorily.  In matching markets, 
market-like allocation occurs but price is not the mechanism that clears the market. In 
addition, the agents – the buyers and sellers – have specific requirements or conditions 
that must be met. One of the most celebrated matching markets is for kidney donation. 
Other examples of matching markets in the US are the hiring of new doctors (interns) 
and choice of school programs (Roth, 2007). Matching markets in effect have become 
21st century clearinghouses. 
 
In the housing context, the principle of the matching markets is evident in choice-based 
letting (CBL) (Hulse and Burke, 2007; Pawson and Hulse, 2011), which is a method of 
social housing allocation. 
 
A Choice Based Lettings (CBL) scheme gives applicants the opportunity to bid for 
 properties which are most appropriate for their needs. A CBL scheme works by 
Local  Authorities and Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) advertising housing 
to potential applicants via local newspapers, newsletters or on a website. The 
system then identifies the successful bidder, which is the applicant who has the 
highest priority. In this case priority is based on the applicant who has the most 
critical needs (Pavier, nd, p. 1). 
 
Traditionally public housing aggregates eligible applicants by placing them on waiting 
lists. In the Australian context, waiting lists are segmented and housing is allocated 
according to priority. There are virtually no search costs. A tenant is called and given a 
small amount of time to accept an offer and there is significant disincentive to refuse.  
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CBL has led to considerable improvement in the allocation process, greater tenant 
satisfaction and cost savings. In market design terms CBL is a two-sided matching 
market. The term 'matching' is used to denote that price is not the mechanism that clears 
the market and that the 'agents' - the tenant and landlords in this case - have specific 
criteria that both want met. On the social housing side it is eligibility criteria, and for the 
tenants the specific housing on offer needs to conform to their needs and desires. With 
CBL a pool of social housing providers exists on one side and a pool of tenants exists on 
the other. A platform – an internet marketplace – enables their mutual preferences to be 
sorted and matched efficiently and quickly. 
 
In smart markets price plays its traditional role in clearing the market. Smart markets 
operate in a range of settings including the wholesale electricity and gas markets (Pekec 
and Rothkopf, 2003; Oren, 2004), mobile phone spectrum rights and airport take-off and 
landing slots. The selling of such rights is typically organised through combinatorial, on 
line auctions. Smart markets are in also development or have been proposed for traffic 
congestion (Markose et al. 2007) and water pricing (Raffensperger, 2009). In Victoria, 
the Department of Sustainability and Environment has established a smart market for 
vegetation offset (DSE, 2012) and Victorian Treasury officials have proposed smart 
markets for planning issues including car-parking requirements, developer contributions 
and planning objections (Stoneham and Thomas 2011). 
 
The application of market design theory to housing is under-developed. Albrecht et al. 
(2006) have applied the theory of matching markets to the buying and selling of existing 
house stock. This exploratory analysis highlights the extent to which housing deviates 
from the economic ideal, which in part explains why there are persistent market 
inefficiencies.  
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Nevertheless, smart market pioneer Charles Plott created a smart market to sell 
apartments in the US (Intellimarket, n.d). Plott noted that auctions of apartments (where 
all apartments go to auction at once) meant buyers who failed to gain their first 
preference were not in a position to bid for their second preference. This meant sub-
optimal prices for vendors. The smart market enabled purchasers to simultaneously 
lodge bids on multiple dwellings but remain liable for only a single purchase, thus 
avoiding what is referred to as exposure risk. As all the bids are lodged at the same time, 
the sale prices remained higher than it would have otherwise been.  
 
If we look at the German experience of THCs, the state supported the formation of 
aggregators or seller/agents, predominately architect-led. In effect, a two sided matching 
market has been brought into existence to overcome the failure of the market to match 
supply and demand. Current aggregation for THCs however is small scale.   
 
Aggregation is the key to efficient allocation of social housing and the formation of 
THCs/HDCs. Theoretically, aggregation could occur for the sale and purchase of existing 
private housing in Australia.  However, in the following section we explore how the 
application of aggregation and market design theory could work in improving the supply 
of new multi-unit housing in existing urban areas where policy-makers are seeking 
housing intensification. Specifically we consider the cost impact on corporate residential 
development.  
 
Aggregating housing consumers: smart markets and for-profit housing 
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The Australian housing system is with one major exception (social housing) 
characterised by bi-lateral trades – that is, sales are between a single seller and a single 
buyer. The creation of a pool of potential buyers on one side, and a pool of 
developers/development opportunities on the other offers the potential to reduce the 
search costs associated with obtaining pre-sales. Aggregation enables potential 
purchasers to be pre-identified and their preferences assessed, and allows for 
communication with developers prior to major decisions being made. It not only 
telescopes the campaign for pre-sales but opens the way for a far more responsive 
approach to development. As a key risk can be substantially avoided development need 
not be as speculative. Indeed, with buyers literally on the ground at project conception, 
especially owner-occupiers, community hostility to increasing density may also be 
mitigated. Figure 1 conceptualises the aggregation and decision-making process. 
 
Figure 2 Smart Housing Market Pathways 
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Large scale aggregation of buyers is the first step in creating a new market, what we a 
Smart Housing Market (SHM), the management of which is ideal for an independent 
third party operator (a Smart Housing Market Manager (SHMM)). The SHM is a hybrid 
matching/smart market that is flexible enough to permit both price and non-price criteria 
as allocation mechanisms. The SHMM actively recruits potential buyers, obtains their 
preferences and capacities and matches them to opportunities (that is, segments them). 
Developers then have the opportunity to shape their offering to actual consumer 
preferences. They then have the opportunity to seek a level of commitment prior to 
purchasing land and/or seeking RDF.  
 
For buyers the SHM is an interactive website where they can manage their profiles, 
browse, and learn (there is a substantial opportunity for on-line education tools relating 
to all aspects of purchasing, selling, renting and maintaining housing). Vendors (for 
example corporate residential developers) can promote their previous developments, not 
just the current project. They can innovate to provide not just high quality virtual tours but 
housing avatars to assist buyers make decisions. Potential buyers can be invited to 
meetings or tours of existing properties. Both sides of the market provide their 
information, and that information can be analysed and put back to the market in real 
time. 
 
In order to appreciate the extent of innovation we can compare the SHM to websites that 
advertise real estate, such as domain.com.au and realestateview.com.au. These 
websites are advertising sites with limited functionality or interactivity. Potential 
purchasers browse the advertisements which direct them to vendors, usually real estate 
agents. Buyers register on these websites to gain access to search options. The website 
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manager has some knowledge of what the consumer wants but that information is not 
used to facilitate development.  The sites are only intended to generate advertising 
revenue. However, the popularity of these websites suggests some level of acceptance 
of internet-based transactions by housing consumers.   
 
A SHM on the other is a genuine communication tool. For HDCs, aggregation of 
member/purchasers is as critical to their project finance as it is for corporate developers. 
HDC members need to commit early in their project. But real life gets in the way of good 
intentions, and people will pull out, potentially jeopardising projects.  Large scale 
aggregation and segmentation provides the answer.  A HDC may form to build a 20 
dwelling apartment block, but having people drop out is a risk. Knowing that there are 
another 30 would-be buyers on a waiting list, of whom 20 could literally step into the 
breach substantially reduces the risks for everyone. The SHM is the mechanism by 
which HDC members can find each other, and find a development opportunity.  In a 
sense the SMH works as a kind of crowd sourcing.  
 
One of a SHM’s desirable features is its capacity to service a range of markets 
concurrently. The larger the scale, the more efficient it is.  Large scale aggregation 
permits robust segmentation into specific housing tenure or options. For example the 
SHM can aggregate private rental tenants enhancing the efficiency of the NRAS by 
permitting developers to avoid the ‘double search’ problem of finding purchasers of the 
apartments and attracting tenants who must be assessed according to eligibility criteria. 
Aggregation of tenants would also benefit equity investment into long-term private rental, 
as proposed by Landcom (2010).  As with NRAS, community housing organisations 
could source tenants for their affordable and key worker housing. In the next section we 
outline how a SHM can support innovation in the affordable housing sector. 
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Unlocking Capacity: Smart Markets and Affordable the NFP sector 
 
The affordable housing sector is largely comprised of not-for-profit organisations that in 
the majority of cases provide subsidised rental housing to people eligible for public 
housing.   The bulk of their capital funding is derived from government, but public 
investment in social housing in Australia is at an historical low.  Traditionally, such 
organisations have supplied housing to client groups via a variety of arrangements.  
Land and/or dwellings were sometimes donated or bequeathed by private individuals, 
families or communities  in exchange for life tenure of a specific person in need, or to 
address a more general need. Ground lease arrangements were quite common. In the 
case of independent living units (ILUS), the federal government provided funding for 
construction where local government or communities could supply land (McNelis, 2007). 
ILUs can be rented or a licence to occupy purchased. Across the affordable housing 
sector purchase options are far less common affordable than rental options. Shared 
equity schemes have been mooted but these have remained mostly within the province 
of government.   
 
Capital for housing associations and providers is subject to the periodic funding derived 
from the National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA), although the National 
Economic Stimulus Plan (NESP) separately funded over 19,000 dwellings and the 
Victorian Government provided an additional  $510m over four years in the 2007/08 
budget (VCOSS, 2009). A consequence of the NESP, coinciding as it did with a sharp 
decline in housing affordability, was interest from NFP organisations with land equity but 
who had not previously provided affordable housing. However, as the purpose of the 
NESP was to quickly generate economic activity these NFPs were poorly positioned to 
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take advantage of the funds. They nevertheless remain interested in housing provision 
and have land but lack a source of capital for construction.  At present there is only 
anecdotal evidence as to the scale of available land held by NFPs that could be utilised 
for affordable housing, and no simple methodology for calculating it.  
 
However, there is every reason to believe that significant land or airspace may be 
available (McShane, 2006; Mian, 2008). Consistent with the historical growth patterns of 
NFPs and membership organisations, a proportion of these assets are located in 
greyfields areas (Barraket, 2008; Leigh, 2010; Lewi and Nichols, 2010; Lyons, 2001). 
Ageing assets and declining membership pose organisational dilemmas for managing 
buildings. Sale onto the open market is often the easiest solution, although, as the sale 
of the inner-Melbourne Ascot Vale Bowls Club in 2001 demonstrated, such a move can 
be highly contentious. In this case the local community had purchased land in the early 
twentieth century to establish a lawn bowling club4. In the 1990s, faced with declining 
membership and revenue, a core membership group changed the club’s constitution 
(which specified long-term retention of the asset in community hands) to permit sale of 
the now highly sought-after site, with the sale proceeds distributed to the members. The 
prospect of such windfall gains from sale in the private market can induce opportunistic 
behaviour and permanent loss of a community asset. Many NFP organisations, of 
course, are likely to be deeply troubled by the ethics of such actions, but nonetheless 
face real revenue pressures. Anecdotal evidence suggests many NFPs are open to 
development alternatives that deliver affordable housing. Research currently being 
undertaken by Sharam and McShane seeks to understand what land resources may be 
available, and the constraints on NFP re-purposing such land for housing. 
                                                 
4 Lawn bowls  is a type of sport 
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Diversifying tenure: equity land trusts 
 
As the current NAHA winds down and negotiation commences for the next agreement, 
little capital is available for constructing affordable housing (noting that NRAS sits 
outside the NAHA). In short the affordable housing sector has access to a source of land 
but limited public funding for construction. In addition to this however is the problem of a 
growing group of households which have been priced out of homeownership and face a 
lifetime in private rental, with implications for their retirement. This cohort however is 
mostly comprised of people who are not poor. Sharam (2011) has proposed equity land 
trusts (ELTs) to capture this latent equity for construction of affordable housing units for 
older single women.  
 
Sharam’s proposal separates the ownership of the land from the ownership of the 
dwelling using a 'land trust' agreement. The corporate structure for a land trust is 
generally a company limited by guarantee with charitable objectives to provide housing 
to those that are unable to purchase on the open market. The owner of the dwelling has 
a strata title to the dwelling and the Trust either owns the land (it may be gifted to the 
Trust or purchased by the Trust) or the Trust leases it at a peppercorn rate from a 
benefactor. Where freehold title is transferred to the land trust, the land trust holds the 
land in perpetuity and the value of the land is excluded from any of the costs an owner is 
expected to pay on purchase.  In this way the end cost to the owner of a dwelling is 
reduced.  The Trust and the donors determine who would be eligible to purchase a 
dwelling. This way ELTs can provide perpetually affordable homes. An owner can 
bequeath or sell to another eligible person otherwise the ELT must re-purchase the 
dwelling. The re-sale price is determined at entry into the scheme - usually the price will 
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reflect the original purchase price plus inflation. Purchasers can also rent out their home 
but there would be restrictions to prevent profiteering. 
 
Purchasers pay for the dwelling in the same way as they would any house in the market 
using savings and/or getting a mortgage. Construction is undertaken by a not-for-profit 
developer such as a Housing Association, or using the Housing Development 
Cooperative model in which the future owners take the role of developer thereby 
reducing the costs. By reducing the cost of the land to practically zero and reducing the 
cost of construction, housing purchasers can buy for as much as half they would pay in 
the existing market. 
 
If leasing occurs a ground lease can be used to protect everyone’s interests and 
determine future use on the site. Ground leases are commonly used in the UK and are 
typically long term (e.g. some leases are up to 999 years) leases.  The leasehold owner, 
as commonly referred to, pays a capital sum at the commencement of the lease and a 
nominal sum (e.g. 10 pounds) throughout the term to the freehold owner termed a 
'ground rent'. The rights a leasehold owner has under a ground rent are akin to that of a 
freehold owner. The leasehold owner is able to develop the premises as so wished and 
is responsible for all payments relating to the premises whilst the landlord/freehold owner 
is responsible for the structure of the building (where the dwelling is an apartment) or the 
land. Ground leases are commonly used by local governments for a range of social 
purposes. They are particularly attractive to local government and not-for-profit 
organisations that wish to use their land assets strategically to deliver their mission. 
Councils for example often have car parks where the airspace is un-developed. Such 
organisations may want to develop or use the ground level for a community purpose, 
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and add value by building apartments above. The land trust and ground lease preserve 
the donor's ownership of the land and controls future use on the site. 
 
ELTs provide the dwelling purchaser with a subsidy so eligibility rules need to be devised 
to reflect the public interest in providing that subsidy. Land donors can influence who 
would be eligible for the subsidy. Each donor community will have a different priority. The 
ELT is managed by an independent board and is charged with managing the physical 
assets (which can also include commercial, community or retail space) and the process 
for buying and selling dwellings, as well as building new homes. Each ELT is supported 
by a shared services company to keep costs down. 
 
ELTs, where dwelling property rights are separated from the land property right (retained 
by the NFP but 'donated' to the dwelling occupier), offer a new basis for affordable 
housing construction if supported by new mortgage products. Smith (2011b) has noted 
both the dearth of attention to private housing finance and the lack of innovation in the 
fundamentals of mortgage finance. ELTs would require mortgage product innovation by a 
conservative industry. However, the history of strata title provides a lesson, both in terms 
of market design fundamentals driving reform and the role of mortgage finance in 
supporting reform. Strata title provides for individual ownership of a dwelling within a 
multi-unit residential property and common ownership and responsibility of the 
associated common property. Common property may include driveways, stairwells, lifts, 
roofs, and gardens (Everton-Moore et al. 2006). Strata title was introduced in Victoria in 
the early 1960s. Prior to that time individual flats could be rented but not purchased. 
'Cooperative' flats (as strata title was initially called) were already common in Sydney 
and were financed through credit cooperatives providing mortgages supported by 
government guarantees. In Melbourne insurance companies (who were significant 
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providers of mortgages) would not initially lend for strata title properties (The Australian 
Women's Weekly, 1969).  
 
ELTs are analogous to strata title properties. What is 'common ownership' under strata 
title becomes 'community ownership' under the ELT. Yet a shift in mortgage lending 
practices is required. Fifty years ago the lending industry looked to the fundamentals: a 
legal, enforceable property right and securitisation. ELTs also provide these.  The history 
of strata title, however, contains a bigger lesson. Law reform and innovation in financing 
created a new market and promoted a new, affordable housing supply.  
 
The SHM can provide the infrastructure for recruiting ELT purchasers. It can work with 
NFPs to bring land onto the 'market' and facilitate development finance and mortgage 
finance for buyers.  The SHM would be the home for later sale or rental of ELT homes. If 
run as a NFP itself, the SHM could use the profit from its private clients to support NFPs, 
land donors and ELTs, including the possibility of purchasing land. At scale a SHM would 
have a very considerable turnover. 
 
We imagine that many ELTs would contract housing associations to construct and 
manage their properties providing a new revenue source to these organisations. 
Similarly housing associations would be well positioned to undertake project 
management and construction on behalf of HDCs.   
 
We also imagine that some NFPs would see residential property development as a 
viable investment vehicle. A SHM means reduced development risks, and property 
development may be viewed as a better performer than other investment classes such 
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as shares.  So in addition to HDCs bringing competition into the private residential 
development sector, a new breed of NFPs with land assets could bring powerful 
branding and further competition into the market.  Housing associations should be 
significant beneficiaries of these innovations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Inefficient allocation problems are being overcome in novel ways by internet-based 
matching markets and smart markets which aggregate buyers and sellers. We argue that 
this innovation can be applied to housing to overcome some intractable problems of 
housing supply in the greyfield areas of Australian cities. By bringing housing consumers 
forward in the supply chain, development costs and risk can be reduced. The 
construction of apartments would be far less speculative and more responsive to 
consumer preferences, enhancing choice and affordability. A smart housing market 
would facilitate the identification of new sources of land for affordable housing; herald the 
rise of equity land trusts; foster innovation in mortgage products; give life to housing 
development cooperatives; strengthen housing associations; promote competition and 
reform in the private sector; promote good urban design; and hold the potential to reduce 
neighbourhood conflict around planning issues. 
 
The growing use of mechanisms such as land trusts can be seen in the context of wider 
international interest in ownership models, social enterprise and cooperative or 
community-based resource management. The stability of new community-based 
institutions in the areas of housing and finance was amply demonstrated during the 
recent global financial crisis (Kelly, 2012). The design of new corporate structures and 
market instruments to produce what Kelly refers to as generative rather than extractive 
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economic benefits is an evolving area of policy and practice that holds the potential to 
make a positive contribute to intractable issues such as housing affordability and 
sustainable urban growth. 
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